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An island of constancy in a sea of change: rethinking project temporalities with long-term 
megaprojects  
 
Abstract: This paper examines the organizational phenomena of long-term projects. While the 
UHVHDUFKOLWHUDWXUHIUDPHVSURMHFWVDV³WHmporary organizations´PHJDSURMHFWVPD\KDYHvery 
long initiation and delivery phases, which may last for many years, sometimes even decades, 
and they deliver capital assets that are used for decades or centuries. Instead of a short-duration 
activity within a fixed organizational context, these projects involve multiple temporalities, 
with a range of more and less temporary forms of organizing combining in the process of 
enactment. Drawing on an example of a long-term infrastructural megaproject, a wind-farm, to 
illustrate the phenomenon, we contribute by articulating different temporalities associated with 
the delivery project, the life-cycle; the stakeholder organizations that set up the project; and the 
special purpose vehicles through which it is delivered and, with reference to understandings of 
risk and knowledge, consider some implications for these temporalities project management 
research and practice. We argue that focus on the multiple temporalities associated with long-
term projects opens up new ways of thinking about projects as temporary organizations for 
researchers and practitioners.  
Keywords 
Temporalities; long-term projects; stakeholders; temporary organizations, risk, knowledge. 
Highlights 
x Examines the organizational phenomena of long-term projects  
x Articulates how these projects involve multiple temporalities  
x In them; the project, stakeholders and special purpose vehicles differ temporally  
x The project may outlive owner and delivery firms; end dates may be negotiated  
x Focus on multiple temporalities offers new insight for researchers and practitioners 
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Introduction 
 
When practitioners and scholars label DQ HQWLW\ D µproject¶ WKH\ W\SLFDOO\ GHPDUFDWH DQ
organizational form that is less temporally durable than its surrounding organizational domain 
(PMBOK, 2013; Turner and Müller, 2003). Assumptions about the relative impermanence of 
a project vis-à-vis it organizational milieu encompass both academic treatises on projects as 
µWHPSRUDU\RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶(e.g. Bakker, 2010; Bakker et al., 2016; Bechky, 2006; Burke and 
Morley, 2016; Jacobsson et al., 2015; Packendorff, 1995) and definitions of projects used by 
professional project management associations (Caupin et al., 1999; PMBOK, 2013). The 
Project Management Institute¶V (PMI) Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) 
explicitly delineates its domain of knowledge from other management activities through the 
relative temporariness of projects:  
 
 Operations are ongoing endeavours that produce repetitive outputs, with resources 
 assigned to do basically the same set of tasks according to the standards 
 institutionalized in a product life cycle. Unlike the ongoing nature of operations, 
 projects are temporary endeavours (PMBOK, 2013: 12).   
 
Similarly, academic research on projects as temporary organizations has consistently drawn 
attention to µ3HUFHLYHG WLPH OLPLWV¶ RQ projects DV µDV RQH SURSHUW\ WKDW GLIIHUHQWLDWHV
WHPSRUDU\ RUJDQL]DWLRQV IURP PRVW RI WKHLU SHUPDQHQW FRXQWHUSDUWV¶ (Packendorff, 1995: 
327). Or, as Jacobsson et al. (2015) more recently explain, the project as temporary 
organization is to be defined as µbeing more or less determinate in its lifespan, as opposed to 
permanent organizations being indeterminate¶ (p15). Such views are often conflated with, and 
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affirm, a parallel assumption that projects are outlasted by a surrounding milieu of more 
enduring organizational forms. The assumption that projects are outlasted by a surrounding 
milieu of more enduring organizational forms is arguably the defining image of organization 
used to apprehend this organizational entity. Consequently, most scholarly deliberations on 
projects are predicated on a contrast between WKH WHPSRUDOLWLHVRISURMHFWVDQG µSHUPDQHQW
FRQWH[WV¶(Sydow et al., 2004: 1477) ± that is, between project time as a µGHGLFDWHGXUJHQF\
DQGVWLPXODWLQJVFDUFLW\¶ (Packendorff, 1995: 327) and an organizational milieu where time is 
µHWHUQDO¶(Lundin and Söderholm, 1995: 450), composed of µRQJRLQJ and repetitive business 
processes¶ (Grabher, 2004: 1477) DQG µHQGXring interpersonal networks, epistemic 
FRPPXQLWLHVDQGLQGXVWULHV¶(Bakker, 2010: 480). Such work has focused on contexts in which 
a well-established project-based organization has multiple projects (e.g. in oil and gas (Prado 
and Sapsed, 2016); or in film (Stjerne and Svejenova, 2016)). From instrumentalist 
approaches to ensure project control (PMBOK, 2013), through deliberations on the challenges 
of project-firm learning and innovation (Brady and Davies, 2004; Grabher, 2004), to critical 
expositions of work intensification (Andersson and Wickelgrenn, 2009; Clegg and 
Courpasson, 2004), project research is persistently prefigured on a dichotomy of durability 
between a longer lasting organizational milieu and an ephemeral project.  
 
Our starting point in this theoretically orientated paper is to interrogate the limits and 
significance of this temporal configuration, as found both within the theorization of projects 
as temporary organizations, and project management research. In so doing we consider a 
group of projects that while they adhere to many of the defining features of projects, from the 
presence of externally imposed goals and defined time limits (PMBOK, 2013; Lundin and 
Söderholm, 1995; Jacobbson et al. 2015), often, endure, and are often perceived from the 
outset to endure, far beyond the life of their surrounding organizations: long-term 
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infrastructure megaprojects. Despite their increasing prevalence, size and complexity (Davies 
et al., 2009; Eweje et al., 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2014; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Giezen, 2012; Kardes 
et al., 2013; Ruuska et al., 2011; van Marrewijk et al., 2008), the temporality of megaprojects 
has had limited attention: they have only fleetingly featured within the theorization of projects 
as temporary organizations. Although, as Jacobsson et al. (2015: 15) make clear, the time 
criterion to consider projects as temporary organizations relates not to their short duration but 
to their fixed longevity (cf. Grabher, 2002: 207; PMBOK, 2013), long-term projects are 
nevertheless routinely marginalized within the theorization of temporary organizations. 
Sydow et al. (2004), for instance, surmise that while projects lasting over a few years are 
temporary organizations, their learning processes are likely µQRWYHU\GLIIHUHQWIURPWKRVHRI
SHUPDQHQW RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ S. 1481). Equally, Jacobsson et al. (2015: 15) note there exist 
µH[FHSWLRQDO H[DPSOes of temporary organizations that have outlasted the permanent 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶\HWWKH\WKHQUHIUDLQIURPHYLGHQFLQJWKHHPSLULFDOSUHYDOHQFHor theoretical 
significance of such a seemingly incongruous temporal configuration.  
 
Set against this under-theorization, the aim of our paper is to consider how the longer time 
duration of some projects, such as infrastructural megaprojects, interacts with an often less 
obdurate, more capricious, organizational milieu. In so doing we will then consider some of 
the possible implications of such less discussed organizational temporalities for the 
development of theories of temporary organization (Jacobsson et al., 2015; Lundin and 
Söderholm, 2013). Although partly informed by research on the management of megaprojects 
(Eweje et al., 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2014), our paper departs from this body of work by considering 
the implications of conceptualizing such long-term projects as µtemporary organizations¶, 
wherein the purpose of research is WR µXQGHUVWDQG SURMHFW SKHQRPHQD UDWKHU WKDQ ILQG
SUHVFULSWLRQVDQGWRROV¶(Jacobsson et al., 2015: 11). As such, our paper principally engages 
6 
 
with, and problematizes existing research conceptualizing the temporalities between 
temporary and permanent organizing (Bakker, 2010; Bakker et al. 2016; Bechky, 2006; Burke 
and Morley, 2016; Lundin and Söderholm, 1995; Packendorff, 1995; Sydow et al. 2004; 
Tyssen et al. 2014). Although some work has begun to acknowledge and explore the 
temporalities of project (Gustavsson and Hallin, 2015; Ligthart et al., 2016) and megaproject 
(Marrewijk et al., 2016), organizing, there is a lack of research reflecting on the temporalities 
of long-term project organizing.  In order to flesh out the significance of our engagement with 
this empirical phenomenon we focus here upon its implications for how risk is understood and 
knowledge generated and shared across the multiple temporalities that characterise major 
infrastructure projects. Our decision to focus here upon risk and knowledge is intended to 
offer an exemplification of the extent to which recognizing the multiple temporalities of 
megaproject organizing, poses theoretical questions that open up new avenues for empirical 
research for both project management, and temporary organization, researchers.        
 
In the next section, we examine current conceptualisations of the relative temporalities of 
projects and their contexts, and how a particular assumption that projects will be outlasted by 
their organizational milieus inflects how they are usually understood and managed. To address 
the more practical and tangible implications of these temporal assumptions, we then discuss 
how they underpin current engagements with project risk and knowledge.  In the following 
two sections, we then characterize the multiple temporalities of long-term project organizing 
drawing upon empirical data generated by a pan-European study of infrastructural 
megaprojects. An example of a long-term infrastructural megaproject ± a large off-shore wind 
farm in the United Kingdom ± is discussed to illustrate the complex temporal configurations 
of megaprojects. In our discussion section, the empirical analysis is then used to discuss the 
relevance of long-term megaprojects to open up new questions and avenues for research in 
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the projects as temporary organization literature. We find the project itself may outlive the 
associated owner and delivery firms involved in its delivery; and has multiple temporalities 
associated with the delivery project; life-cycle; stakeholder organizations that set up the 
project; and the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) through which many long-term projects are 
delivered. In the final section of the paper, we conclude by examining how the phenomenon 
of long-term projects may require us to rethink some of the founding assumptions of how we 
apprehend projects as both temporary organizations (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995; Jacobbson 
et al. 2015), with a particular reference to issues of risk and knowledge management, and how 
the idea of multiple temporalities may open up new ways of thinking for researchers and 
practitioners.  
 
The relative temporalities of projects and their environments  
 
Understandings of projects are highly pluralistic in terms of their epistemologies, methods and 
metaphors of organization (Bredillet, 2008; Söderlund, 2011; Turner et al., 2013; Winter and 
Szczepanek, 2009). There is general agreement that projects need to be understood in relation 
to their organizational context (Engwall, 2003); that megaprojects and their contexts are 
mutually interdependent (Millar and Lessard, 2001); and as Söderlund (2004: 185) identifies, 
projects are relatively ephemeral within wider organizational contexts. Nevertheless there are 
discernible differences of emphasis in how and why such relative impermanence is articulated, 
whether in terms of project duration, goal orientation and relationships with permanent 
organizations.  
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Interpretations of the duration of projects as temporary organizations vary widely. Bechky 
(2006), for example, characterizes temporary organizations as µflexible, discontinuous and, 
ephemeral¶S. For others, such as Sydow et al. (2004), absolute quantitative limits can be 
placed around the notion of projects as temporary organizations, such that temporary 
organizing explicitly corresponds with the short-term projects, with an assumption that 
learning processes in long-term projects, of over 5 years, are more similar to that of firms (for 
a similar short-term definition see Tyssen et al. 2014). Other researchers consider that 
organizations with a time-span of over 5-10 years should be considered as temporary 
organizations if their lifespan is finite: 
 
There seems to be a debate in the literature on whether systems of relatively longer 
duration (although still limited by a deadline in a distant future) should be called 
µWHPSRUDU\¶7KHGRPLnant view suggests they should (Bakker, 2010: p. 474). 
 
In the light of the above definition, in which the notion of temporary organization is about 
time boundaries that are established ex-ante (see also Bakker et al. 2016) rather than their 
absolute short duration, it becomes meaningful to consider long-term infrastructural 
megaprojects as temporary organizations. Indeed, citing the case of the Hultsfred Festival 
(Lindgren and Packendorff, 2005), Jacobsson et al. (2015: 15) suggest there exist in the 
extant literature at least one exceptional example of a temporary organization that outlasts 
its surrounding organizational milieu (Karmowska et al., 2016). The empirical case of long-
term infrastructural megaprojects suggests that such examples are increasingly far from 
exceptional, and indeed worthy of greater theorization. 
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As is evident, researchers have increasingly resisted absolutist duration-based definitions of 
projects as short-term temporary organization (as in Sydow et al., 2004), and instead moved 
towards a definition of projects as temporal organizations on the basis of their ex-ante time-
defined goals (Bakker, 2010; Bakker et al., 2016; Hanisch and Wald, 2014; Jacobsson et al., 
2015; Maaninen-Olsson and Müllern, 2009). Thus Burke and Morley (2016) explain: 
µDespite the subtle nuances in emphasis, all definitions do agree that temporary 
organizations have an ex ante GHWHUPLQHG WHUPLQDWLRQ SRLQW¶ (p1237). Unlike permanent 
organizations, temporary organizations can thus be further characterised as being tasked to 
achieve a particular objective (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995), set and monitored by a long-
lasting organizational milieu. Thus Kenis et al. (2009) define a temporary organization as 
follows: 
 
A temporary organization forms for the purpose of accomplishing an ex-ante 
determined task that has a pre-determined termination point. It can be intra-
organizational, occurring within an existing non-temporary organization, or inter-
organizational, a joint collaboration amongst a number of organizations (Kenis et al., 
2009: p. 2 [italics in original]).  
 
As Kenis et al. (2009) indicate, the traditional view is that projects sit within firms, or across 
groups of firms, and that these firms outlive projects. This relatively durability is assumed 
because it is this milieu of external organizations that establishes and controls goals for the 
project, giving rise to another recurring definitional condition of temporary organizations: 
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their µLQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HGWHUPLQDWLRQ¶(Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). Thus, any project goal 
is said to require an ex-ante termination date whether µIL[HGHLWKHUE\DVSHFLILFGDWHRUE\
the attainment RIDSUHGHILQHGVWDWHRUFRQGLWLRQ¶(Bakker et al., 2009: 203). This latter caveat 
is important in indicating an analytical distinction between defined temporariness, where a 
fixed goal is completed on time, and a project is terminated as planned, and precarious 
temporariness, where a goal shifts and thus project termination is extended but still mandated 
and always sought after (Karmowska et al., 2016). Thinking along these lines, Gustavasson 
and Hallin (2015) make a similar analytical distinction in their framing of projects as 
WHPSRUDU\ RUJDQL]DWLRQV EHWZHHQ µJRDO-RULHQWDWHG¶ SURMHFWV ZLWK predetermined ex-ante 
WLPHERXQGDULHVDQGµJRDO-VHHNLQJ¶SURMHFWVWKDWDUHZRUNLQJWRwards the definition of ex-
ante time boundaries. Both project types can thus be regarded temporary organizations on 
the basis of an existing or aspirational ex-ante time-limited duration. Indeed, as Jacobsson et 
al. (2015) explain, D GHILQLQJ IHDWXUH RI WKH WHPSRUDU\ RUJDQL]DWLRQ LV WKH µH[WHUQDO
organizational requirement or pressure in terms of RQHRUPRUHRI« goal, expectation, or 
FRQWURO¶S 
 
We herein follow the emerging consensus in previous work that suggests it is their pre-
determined duration, whether on the basis of existing, or aspired, time-based or other goals, 
that defines projects as temporary organizations. But, in so doing, we also want to draw 
attention to a less considered assumption regarding relative temporalities within work on 
projects as temporary organizations. That is, despite the shift away from absolutist 
definitions of temporary organizations as short-term towards time prescribed definitions of 
temporary organizing, the temporary organization literature remains predicated on a 
naturalized temporal distinction from permanent organization. In their seminal writing on 
the subject, Lundin and Söderholm (1995) describe this difference thus: 
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For firms whose future is perceived as eternal, the future will naturally continue to be 
seen as eternity: the result of subtracting any finite number from infinity always leaves 
infinity. For the temporary organization, on the other hand, time is always running out 
since it is finite from the start, limited for instance by contracts or other conditions 
(Lundin and Söderholm, 1995: p. 439).  
 
The difficulty with this distinction is that it suggests WKDW PHPEHUV RI µSHUPDQHQW¶
organizations perceive that their organization will last into infinity and on this basis it is to be 
regarded as permanent. It is easy to evidence that a project, whose purpose involves its 
extinction, will not last forever, and is thus a temporary organization (Packendorff, 1995; 
Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). However this rather safe assumption has seemingly been 
conflated with a much more difficult assumption: organizing around an ex-ante termination 
date means that the temporary organization is always relatively less durable, or lacking in 
µpermanence¶ relative to organizations without such a date. It is this assumption around 
temporary organizing, that remains mostly assumed rather than empirically tested, that forms 
the point of theoretical departure for this paper.  
 
The recurrent naturalized distinction between the temporalities of µSHUPDQHQW¶ DQG
µWHPSRUDU\¶RUJDQL]LQJ in the literature (Bakker et al. 2016; Burke and Morley, 2016; Tyssen 
et al. 2014) evidences a pervasive lack of reflection on the assumption that impermanence 
always goes hand in hand with a pre-set organizational duration. Bakker et al. (2016), for 
example, develop a typological distinction as a continuum between temporary and permanent 
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RUJDQL]DWLRQ ZKHUHLQ µRQO\ WKH FODVVLF SHUPDQHQW RUJDQL]DWLRQDO IRUP « LV typically not 
UHODWHGWRWHPSRUDU\RUJDQL]LQJHIIRUWV¶(p$VWKH\WKHQH[SODLQµWHPSRUDU\LQRXUYLHZ
should refer to predetermined duration, i.e., whether at the outset the time boundaries of an 
organizational process or venture are explicitly set...¶ whereas µ³SHUPDQHQW´LQWKLVYLHZLV
understood as ³LQGHWHUPLQDWH´²that is, open-ended with regard to time horizon¶ (Bakker et 
al, 2016: 1708). This seemingly straightforward distinction glosses over the empirical 
complexities that long-term infrastructural megaprojects, and other organizational forms 
present in assuming that µSHUPDQHQFH¶, or a perception of increased organizational 
permanence, is always an outcome of a lack of organizing a defined termination date. After 
all, no organizations will last to eternity, and all are in any case always in a state of flux or 
becoming (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002).  More empirically, a 2002 survey of Fortune 500 
companies reveals an average lifespan of just 40 to 50 years (De Geus, 2002); while equally 
in the US, the average time spent in one company is just 4.6 years within an average career 
lifespan of just under four decades (Department of Labor, 2016).  
 
Long-term megaprojects with fixed termination dates of one or more decades, may, in the 
context of employee and organizational temporalities, readily presage a relative increase in 
durability and permanence over and above organizations with no fixed termination date. As 
Gustavsson and Hallin (2015) put it µ,Q WRGD\¶V ³SRVW-EXUHDXFUDWLF´ RUJDQL]DWLRQV
characterized by turbulence and constant restructuring, the project in many cases stands for 
permanence, for example, UDWKHUWKDQWHPSRUDOLW\¶S  Long-term megaprojects have, or 
look to have, a pre-defined duration, and, as such, can be considered temporary organizations 
(Bakker et al. 2016). And yet, it is considerable more difficult to empirically evidence they 
are always less enduring, or permanent, than the organizational milieu that surrounds them, 
RU LQGHHG LQLWLDWHV DQG FRQWUROV WKHLU µLQVWLWXWLRQDO WHUPLQDWLRQ¶. Indeed, the surrounding 
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organizational milieu, let alone members, that set or seek their initial goals, and end date, are 
highly unlikely to remain the same through to the point of that termination.  
 
Understanding the significance of relative temporalities through project risk and 
knowledge 
 
Given the extent to which the concept of the temporary organization has become analytically 
unclear, not least because of the difficulty in empirically validating abstract temporal 
dichotomies between temporary and permanent organization, we propose that what is required 
is further empirical analysis of concepts associated with temporary organization that tests, and 
challenges, rather than confirms the limits of their applicability. In order to develop such an 
analysis we briefly review two strands of understanding related to projects as temporary 
organizations on risk and knowledge. These strands are mobilized because of their 
significance within the projects as temporary organization literature (and related project 
management literature), and because they are prefigured upon, and serve to reinforce, an 
assumption of the relative impermanence of projects vis-à-vis their surrounding organizational 
milieu. Our aim in engaging these concepts here is to highlight what is at stake in our 
understanding of projects as temporary organizations when we can no longer assume the 
relative permanence of a surrounding organizational milieu.  
 
Risk has long been a central strand in the way projects are defined as relatively less durable 
than their organizational milieu. The Guide to the PMBOK (2013) repeatedly evokes the 
concept of risk to articulate a boundary between the ephemeral project and its external milieu 
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of permanent organizational stakeholders. Unexpected changes to project goals (e.g. increases 
in the scope of the project) and resources (e.g. increases in staff time or delays in budget 
approvals), mandated by permanent organizations, are herein related to positive (opportunities) 
and negative risks this might present to the one or more permanent organizations with a stake 
in the project; this diagnosis feeds into an evolving and probabilistic risk management plan 
which categorizes risk on the basis of their probability and impact on the same permanent 
organizations, taking into account prefigured risk appetites and tolerances. This risk 
management plan can then be used by project stakeholders to track old and new risks and define 
risk control strategies in advance of their emergence (PMBOK, 2013).  
 
As Hanisch and Ward (2014) indicate, in their consideration of complexity in temporary 
organizations, what underpins the way risk is understood in projects, and other temporary 
organizations, LVDFRQWUDVWZLWKSHUPDQHQWRUJDQL]LQJFDWHJRUL]HGDVµ/RZGHJUHHRIQRYHOW\
less uncertainty and risk, routine-EDVHGZRUN¶PMBOK, 2013: 199). Indeed, as the PMBOK 
(2013) approach illustrates, it is only from the purview of a contrasting permanent organization 
where uniqueness, and thus complexity and unpredictability, is relatively minimal, that risks 
within a project, and around a project context, can be effectively managed. To make this point 
clearer still, imagine a counter-example ± a project where the stakeholder organizations 
involved were too ephemeral to purposefully identify their risk appetites or tolerances or indeed 
track risks across a project. Such a project is clearly difficult to view positively in terms of 
stability, from the point of view of how the PMBOK define risk management. The root 
assumption at work here in these deliberations on risk management is that a project is a 
relatively less durable temporary organization, with a defined termination date, that will 
typically, though certainly not always (Engwall, 2003; Grabher, 2004), be a conduit through 
which more unique and thus complex, unpredictable and risky work is undertaken (Burke and 
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Morley, 2016; Hobday, 2000; Packendorff, 1995). Permanent organizing is not viewed as less 
risky because it is geographically commonplace but rather because it is temporally consistent, 
and thus benefits from an accumulated knowledge base, and heightened level of trust in that 
knowledge, from which risk can be more effectively controlled DQG µRSWimum practice is 
SRVVLEOH¶ $WNLQVRQHWDO. The question which we will revisit in the subsequent 
sections of this paper is how we might rethink project risk in a temporary organization such as 
a long-term infrastructural megaproject where an accumulated knowledge based might accrue 
within, not beyond, the project. In order to further refine our exploration of this subject we will 
now consider another strand of understanding projects as temporary organizations which is 
heavily predicated on their relative impermanence ± knowledge.  
 
The relative impermanence of projects as temporary organizational forms vis-à-vis a permanent 
organizational milieu is also persistently identified as a key feature and challenge for 
knowledge management in projects. The central concern here is a µOHDUQLQJparadox¶ (Bakker 
et al. 2011) which is frequently said to surround project work wherein, while projects are, as a 
result of their unique task focus often an excellent domain for context-specific knowledge 
creation (Grabher, 2004; Hobday, 2000; Lundin and Söderholm, 1995; Prencipe and Tell, 
2001), their relative impermanence has a major negative impact on knowledge sharing: 
 
« the temporary nature of projects by the same token seems to inhibit the 
sedimentation of knowledge, because when the project dissolves and participants move 
on, the created knowledge is likely to disperse (Bakker et al., 2011).  
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Such sentiments on the organizational amnesia of projects as temporary, time-limited, 
organizations, and the wider knowledge learning paradox have been repeatedly acknowledged 
in the literature (Brady and Davies, 2004; Burke and Morley, 2016; Grabher, 2004; Hobday, 
2000; Scarborough et al. 2004; Sydow et al. 2004). And just as with risk, here the concept of 
knowledge helps clearly articulate the significance of a temporary boundary between the 
relative impermanence of a less durable, time-limited project and a surrounding indefinite, 
more permanent, organizational milieu of project stakeholders. Responding to this view, 
Bakker et al (2011), describe how the level of connectivity, or embeddedness, between the 
parent organization(s) around the project, enables successful knowledge management within 
temporary organizing. In other words, while the relatively less permanent project itself might 
be prone to organizational amnesia, this can be mitigated if it is sufficiently well connected to 
a wider set of time indefinite relationships, that take shape within (Brady and Davies, 2004) 
and between parent firms, epistemic communities and personal networks (Prencipe and Tell, 
2001; Grabher, 2004; Scarborough et al. 2004). To this end, Bakker et al (2011) identify various 
factors influencing knowledge sharing between the permanent organizations involved in the 
project, including relational embeddedness (frequency of interactions creating trust and 
resource commitments), cognitive embeddedness (shared meanings leading to mutual 
understanding but sufficient differences to enable learning) and temporary embeddedness 
(longevity of relationship creating structures for knowledge sharing and a shared knowledge-
base), along with their accompanying ability to absorb and recognize the value of knowledge 
DQGPRWLYDWLRQV ZLOOLQJQHVV WRVKDUHNQRZOHGJH%DNNHUHWDO¶V HPSLULFDO UHVHDUFK
suggests that µWKHUH is a clear and unambiguous responsibility of the project owner (the 
permanent SDUHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQLQSURMHFWNQRZOHGJHWUDQVIHU¶%DNNHUHWDO  
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Set against the empirical context of our research, what is missing from these debates is the 
extent to which a project, time bounded by decades, rather than years, retains its primacy, over 
a time indefinite (often shorter lived) organizational milieu, as a domain for risk control 
(Hanisch and Ward, 2014) and knowledge exploration over exploitation (Brady and Davies, 
2004). Such important questions remains unaddressed when researchers continue to naturalize 
the dichotomous view of project temporalities as less durable than their environment as a result 
of their existing, or desired, time-limited duration (Bakker et al. 2016). In what follows we will 
challenge this assumption, and by extension address the questions this challenge possess for 
our exemplary concepts of risk and knowledge, with reference to our empirical context ± long-
term infrastructural megaprojects. 
 
Long-term infrastructure megaprojects as temporary organizations: characterizing the 
phenomenon 
 
 
Large infrastructure projects are µPHJDSURMHFWV¶, where these are defined loosely as those 
projects with budgets of over $1 billion (Davies et al., 2009; Eweje et al., 2012; Flyvbjerg et 
al., 2003; Kardes et al., 2013; Merrow, 2011) with some project costs, for example in nuclear 
decommissioning, now reach up to and beyond $100bn (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2014). The 
characteristics of such projects are significantly different from those which take place within a 
single firm and are of a short duration, for example in new product development. Megaprojects 
are of significant scale and delivered through coalitions and collaborations across the 
boundaries of firms and they have extended delivery phases, which take years and sometimes 
decades. The phenomenon of megaprojects has been examined largely in relation to external 
stakeholders, front-end decisions and impacts: the poor performance of megaproject delivery 
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(Flyvbjerg, 2014; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003); the political nature of strategic decisions about which 
projects to fund, and the associated corruption (Marrewijk, 2015; Nguh, 2013), and the broader 
societal consequences of these projects (e.g. Müller, 2011). Relatively less attention has been 
paid to their potential to be understood from the analytical prism of projects as temporary 
organization (Bakker et al. 2016), and thus their multiple, and complex, temporalities have 
been overlooked. Yet as we have sought to show above there is an emerging consensus that 
any time-bound organizational form is a temporary organizations (Bakker et al. 2016: 1708). 
Long-term infrastructure megaprojects can thus be defined as temporary organizations with 
contractually limited lifespans and temporal phases (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). The legal 
entities, the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), that are set up to deliver them may similarly be 
regarded as temporary organizations if their existence is legally or de facto linked to the 
achievement of defined project goals (Brookes and Sainati, 2015). These firms are typically 
involved across the operational lifetime of the assets (from construction to decommissioning), 
which may be years, decades or, in a few cases, such as railways, centuries. And yet, the 
sponsoring firms that establish projects and SPEs, set and monitor goals, and resource them, 
might endure for far less time despite their indefinite termination dates. In short, viewed as 
temporary organizations, megaprojects are troublesome cases. While temporary organizations, 
they are far from temporary relative to most other organizations. In fact they often last longer 
than the supposedly stable and permanent forms of organization through which they are created 
and associated. They thus resist and complicate the prevailing dichotomous view of project 
temporalities introduced thus far within this paper, suggesting instead the need to consider a 
more complex set of multiple temporalities within their project ecologies.  
 
<<Insert Table 1 here>> 
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Table 1 compares the characteristics of long-term projects with the way that projects are 
described as temporary organizations. Some of the recent work on megaprojects problematizes 
what is meant by a project or a temporary organization, it draws attention to the changing 
boundary between project delivery and operations; to the multi-organization nature of delivery 
and to the SPV or firm within the evolving inter-firm coalition that delivers the project. 
 
In seeking to understand the multiple temporalities of long-term megaproject it is important to 
establish their typical ecologies (Grabher, 2004) and some important factors complicating a 
consideration of their temporalities. ,QWKHFRQWH[WRIVXFKSURMHFWVWKHWHUPµecology¶UHIHUV
to the environment of the project, with its surrounding set of other involved organizations, 
which may be public or private (Lobo and Whyte, 2017; Winch, 2013). First, it is crucial to 
define when a long-term infrastructural megaproject begins and ends. This seemingly 
straightforward question is complicated by contractual arrangements such as Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPP) which may involve separate, or singular, firms across the initiation, 
delivery, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of infrastructure. One way to 
theorize this situation is to see megaprojects as time-limited delivery projects, handing over to 
an operation phase, with a multiplicity of temporalities and patterns of temporariness and 
continuity across this hand-over. In this instance, a termination phase could be defined as the 
formal opening, or commissioning, of the piece of infrastructure for regular use by the 
operations team. Another approach is to argue that projects themselves encompass an operation 
phase. Alderman et al. (2014), for example, highlight a service-led operational phase associated 
with train, sewerage and port equipment projects. They see all stages of project delivery as 
increasingly influenced E\ WKHFOLHQW¶VFXVWRPHUV (Alderman et al., 2014) as well as by the 
environment, supply network and client, as a result of this greater level of integration between 
delivery and operation. A more radical view, as indicated in simplified form in Figure 1, would 
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be that in long-term projects the whole life-cycle of the infrastructure is one project (Alderman 
et al., 2014; Brady et al., 2005): that includes the initiation, delivery, operation and 
decommissioning of infrastructure.  
 
<<Insert Figure 1 here>> 
 
These multiple termination dates are far from unusual and are suggestive of a deeper 
complication to an analysis of megaproject temporalities, namely that different stakeholder 
organizations might view the temporalities of certain megaproject differently dependent upon 
their particular engagement with it. That is, there may be no universally agreed upon 
termination date but rather prospective multiple termination dates which correspond with 
distinct project phases spanning decades or even centuries.  
 
Another complicating ingredient in the temporalities of such megaprojects is that there is a 
widespread use of a form of project organization that was founded on employing an equity-
based SPV. This organization has a specific purpose to design, deliver and sometimes to 
operate large scale infrastructure megaprojects. Special purpose vehicles are legal entities 
(usually a limited company of some type or, sometimes, a limited partnership) created to fulfil 
specific objectives (Sainati et al., forthcoming). Once these objectives are fulfilled the SPV 
will usually be dissolved as its existence is either legally or de facto linked to pre-defined 
project goals which are themselves time-limited (Brookes and Sainati, 2015). In this sense, this 
kind of firm, while often lacking an explicit, legal, termination date, and thus failing to adhere 
directly to some definitions of a temporary organization (Bakker et al. 2016), might be regarded 
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as a temporary organization by proxy as its existence is inextricably linked to the ex-ante, 
temporal goals of the project. While the use of SPVs has received attention in the project 
literature (Daube et al., 2008; Grimsey and Lewis, 2002) the implications of these forms has 
not been considered beyond their ability to mitigate and share risks, with limited exceptions 
(e.g. Smyth and Edkins, 2007). To fully consider long-term megaprojects as temporary 
organizations, we must examine the full range of uses of SPVs from purely financial 
instruments to organizational structures, governance mechanisms and temporary contexts in 
which complex behaviours are enacted.  
 
Set against these temporarily bounded, but somewhat long lasting, temporary organizations, 
the organizational and commercial context within which such long-term projects are developed 
is increasingly dynamic and unpredictable (Flvvbjerg, 2014; Pitsis et al. 2003; Williams et al. 
2015), challenging assumptions of unchanging firms in stable industries. To this end scholars 
have examined how project cultures, and differences between the project culture of the 
megaproject and associated organizations can affect performance in the face of pervasive 
uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity in project environments (van Marrewijk et al., 2008) 
and how strategic decisions within megaprojects are negotiated with external stakeholders 
(Lundrigan et al., 2014). While some, such as Sanderson (2012), have argued the organizational 
milieu that constitutes megaprojects is so dynamic, it demands new epistemological and 
methodological approaches wherein knowledge is derived from practices of spontaneous 
governing in and around projects not simply from the ex-ante governance calculations and 
decisions of µSHUPDQHQW¶sponsoring organizations. 
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The megaproject ecology encompasses a complex mix of multiple temporalities spanning a 
multiplicity of time-limited goals within a project plan, a goal-limited SPV, and a capacious 
mix of time-indefinite project sponsors, contractors, supply chains, and other stakeholders. 
Notwithstanding this temporal complexity, all long-term infrastructure megaprojects can 
readily be said to adhere to all the characteristics frequently ascribed to the three conditions 
that Jacobsson et al. (2015) proposes define temporary organization: (i) external pressure (for 
goal, expectation, control); (ii) internal management (of team, task, time); and a (iii) choice 
proceVVDQGDQµHQGVWDWH¶WKDWLVWREHRUKDVWREHUHDFKHG In affirming this categorisation we 
intend to unpack the creatively troublesome implications for how we might understand 
megaprojects, and other long-term projects, as temporary organizations. To illustrate more 
precisely what is at stake here we now turn towards the case of the Greater Gabbard Offshore 
Windfarm (Brookes, 2015). A more detailed focus on this windfarm allows us to start to 
consider the implications of these temporalities for how we understand projects as temporary 
organizations with reference to our exemplary concepts of risk and knowledge.  
 
Greater Gabbard Offshore Windfarm  
 
 
,Q  LQ WKH 8. WKH &URZQ (VWDWHV DV SDUW RI WKH 8. *RYHUQPHQW¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR 
achieving carbon emission reductions, auctioned a series of licences to establish large off-
shore wind farms to generate electricity. One of these licences was provided to establish an 
off-shore wind farm off the coast of South East England at a site called Greater Gabbard. This 
licence was purchased by an organization set up specifically to deliver a wind farm called 
Greater Gabbard Off-Shore Wind Ltd (GGOWL). The case of GGOWL provides exemplar 
features of a long-term project organization (an SPV) established to support a specific project; 
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the relative longevity of the project; and significant SHUWXUEDWLRQV LQ LWV µSHUPDQHQW¶
organizational milieu. Figure 2 shows the development of these.  
 
<<Insert Figure 2 here>> 
 
GGOWL was initially set-up as an SPV, which was organized as a joint venture between 
Airtricity (an entrepreneurial young organization based in the Republic of Ireland) and Fluor 
(a well-established contractor with a long record of large infrastructure project delivery). In 
the period 2003 ± 2007, GGOWL successfully applied for all of the permits associated with 
the provision of an extremely large off-shore wind farm (The wind farm comprising ~150 
turbines has a capacity of 500MW, enough to power 530,000 homes in the UK).  
 
7KHILUVWSHUWXUEDWLRQLQWKHµSHUPDQHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ZLWKZKLFK**2:/ZDVDVVRFLDWHG
was the demise of Airtricity through its takeover by Scottish and Southern Electricity (SSE) 
in 2007. At this point the original owner of Airtricity left this megaproject completely to form 
another completely separate renewable energy company. SSE were then faced with 
developing an ongoing relationship with the other owner of GGOWL, Fluor. SSE resolved 
thLVLVVXHE\SXUFKDVLQJ)OXRU¶VVKDUHRIWKH**2:/IURP)OXRUIRU0**2:/DWWKH
instigation of SSE, then contracted with Fluor to act as the EPC (engineer-procure-construct) 
contractor for the offshore wind farm (excluding turbine provision which was delivered by 
Siemens). The contract comprised a fixed sum agreement of $1.8bn. 
 
GGOWL underwent another change in ownership later in 2008 when SSE decided to sell 50% 
of its shares in GGOWL to the German power utility company RWE for £308M. At this stage, 
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therefore, GGOWL had experienced four owners in five years. Meanwhile, GGOWL had 
continued in its activity of delivering the offshore wind farm and in late 2008 entered its 
construction phase. Once it entered its construction phase GGOWL began to experience 
substantive difficulties in its construction activity leading to a number of delays. Tier 1 
subcontractors went bankrupt leaving large proportions of undersea cable to be laid. The 
foundations on which the turbines were located were provided by inexperienced sub-
contractors. Significant numbers of these were not to specification and had to be re-welded. 
These factors led to a delay in construction of the project of over eighteen months. As a result 
of these delays, in the last quarter of 2010, Fluor made provision in its accounts for losses of 
£340 million. The relationship between GGOWL and Fluor deteriorated even further and in 
2011, Fluor sued GGOWL for £300m; a lawsuit which in 2013 Fluor were ultimately to settle 
outside court. 
 
Despite these difficulWLHVWKH*UHDWHU*DEEDUGZLQGIDUPZDVRSHQHGLQ-XO\E\WKH8.¶V
Energy Minister. This means that the GGOWL SPV has had an existence as a temporary 
organization for 11 years during which time it was responsible for the design and delivery of 
the wind farm. Over this time-period, GGOWL experienced the demise of one of its original 
µSHUPDQHQW¶RUJDQL]DWLRQRZQHUV$LUWULFLW\DQGKDVH[SHULHQFHGVXEVWDQtive changes in the 
nature of its subsequent owners during this period; a Tier 1 subcontractor went bankrupt, and 
the relationship with Fluor changed from part ownership to EPC contractor to legal challenger, 
with GGOWL receiving a £300m claim and making counter claims1. The 2007 document 
setting out the plan for the eventual decommissioning of the wind farm states that:  
                                                          
1 See http://www.nabarro.com/clients/greater-gabbard-offshore-wind-ltd/case-study/ accessed 06/01/2017 
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Whilst the design life for the project is 25 years, the lease term for is 50 years. As such, 
**2:/¶VH[SHFWDWLRQLV WKDW WKHSURMHFWZLOl be µUH-SRZHUHG¶PLGZD\WKURXJKWKH
lease term. In comparison to full decommissioning as described above, this is only 
likely to involve removing and replacing the turbine topsides and possibly some 
additional equipment, such as that on the transformer platforms.  
 
1RQHWKHOHVV**2:/DFNQRZOHGJHVWKH8.¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQVWKDWUHTXLUH
that installations are decommissioned as soon as is reasonably practicable. As such, 
adequate provisions must be in place to ensure that the project can be fully 
decommissioned at year 25 in order that Government is not exposed to unacceptable 
risk. This programme therefore sets out the measures for decommissioning the project 
at year 25 (GGOWL, 2007: p. 52).  
 
The legal organization established as a long-term project organization to deliver the wind farm 
is now having a continued existence in operating the wind farm, and it is clear from associated 
GRFXPHQWDWLRQWKDWWKHµSURMHFW¶LVXQGHUVWRRGby practitioners to be the full life-cycle of the 
wind farm, rather than the delivery phase. The operational phase is due to last for the next 50 
years during which GGOWL will continue to operate the wind farm and, ultimately, to be 
responsible for its safe decommissioning. This full µlife IRUWKHSURMHFW¶is planned at the outset, 
but although there is an intention for the project to end, the end-date continues to be negotiated 
within a shifting political environment.  
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Discussion and conclusions 
 
While extant research literature frDPHVSURMHFWVDV³WHPSRUDU\RUJDQL]DWLRQV´we argue that 
megaprojects may have very long initiation and delivery phases, which may last for many 
years, sometimes even decades, and they deliver capital assets that are used for decades or 
centuries. Thus the paper contributes by showing how, instead of a short-duration activity 
within a fixed organizational context, these projects involve multiple temporalities, with a 
range of more and less temporary forms of organizing combining in the process of enactment.  
 
Our case highlights how there are multiple temporalities associated with the project for Greater 
Gabbard Offshore Windfarm; particularly in relation to 1) the initiation and delivery project; 
2) the life cycle; 3) the stakeholder organizations that set up the project; and 4) the SPV through 
which it is delivered. First, the project itself might be considered in relation to the initiation 
and delivery project, the 11 years of the design and delivery of the Greater Gabbard wind farm.  
 
Second ± as in the work of Alderman et al. (2014) and Brady et al. (2005) and the discourse of 
practitioners in our case ± the project can also be considered as incorporating the full life-cycle 
through use to decommissioning. The existence of the wind farm is time-limited: with a usage 
period of 25 or potentially 50 years, as implied in the quoted document (GGOWL, 2007: p. 
52), which indicates the expectation that ³WKHSURMHFWZLOOEHµUHSRZHUHG¶´ half way through 
the lease. Thus, from this second perspective, while there will be an end date for the overall 
scheme (and the GGOWL SPV), when this will be is left equivocal, with conflicting legislative 
and commercial reasons for a 25 or 50 year end-date. There is an expectation that this decision 
will be revisited and renegotiated when the project is in operation. Such use of the term 
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µSURMHFW¶IRUWKLVZLGHUOLIH-cycle challenges existing understandings of a project as the delivery 
project. Yet, it fits the broader understandings of projects as temporary organizations due to 
their ex ante time duration and institutional termination (Bakker et al. 2016; Jacobbson et al. 
2015)  
   
Third, the organizational milieu of the project consists of organizations that, in this case, proved 
not to be permanent or enduring, either in their relationship with the project or as organizations. 
Fluor started as owner, acted as contractor and ultimately sued GGOWL. Airtricity was taken 
over by SSE. Thus in this case, we might contrast the longevity of the long-term delivery 
project with the more transient nature of the µSHUPDQHQW¶RUJDQL]DWLRQthat commissioned it. 
The firms associated with the project (SPV, owners, clients, supply-chain) exhibit different 
longevity of association with the project through the life-cycle; and different degrees of 
longevity or transience as firms. Changes in ownership represent a significant risk for the long-
term project and need to be addressed as such by project managers. 
 
Fourth, the special purpose vehicle GGOWL is set up as a firm specifically for the project of 
Greater Gabbard Offshore Windfarm: both in delivery and in operations. It delivers the facility, 
and although given a 50 year lease, it is initially allowed a usage period of 25 years. Hence, 
while this, like the project, is a temporary organization, this SPV is relatively long-lasting (36 
years or more); and because of uncertainty regarding the end date of the project there is similar 
uncertainty relating to the longevity of the SPV as a firm.  
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These temporal complexities pose important questions for how we might understand this 
project as a temporary organization, not least in terms of our exemplary concepts of risk and 
knowledge. For example, as introduced earlier in this paper, project risk is frequently 
understood as being generated by the unique task and time duration of a project as a temporary 
organization vis-à-vis its surrounding organizational milieu (Burke and Morley, 2016; Hobday, 
2000; Packendorff, 1995). The corresponding lack of an accumulated knowledge base and 
heightened level of distrust in projects has thus been suggested as reasons for increases in 
uncertainty, and the importance of risk management, in project-based organizing (Atkinson et 
al. 2006). Viewed as such, the mitigation of risk is said to require a stable project environment 
where known and emerging project risks can identified, calculated and controlled (PMBOK, 
2013). The case of Greater Gabbard, and similar long-term infrastructural megaprojects, 
spanning several decades, suggests that such a stable environment may be considerably more 
likely to reside within rather than outside the boundaries of the project. This project, and its 
SPV, while possessing a defined, or sought termination date, has already beyond its 
surrounding organizational milieu, and might readily be expected, according to the literature 
on knowledge in temporary organizations, to develop an accumulated knowledge base, and 
level of trust in that knowledge, by virtue of its slow, almost routine, development. Future 
research, especially perhaps practice-based research (Sanderson, 2012), could reveal whether 
WKLV µIOLSSLQJ¶ LQ WKH UHODWLYH WHPSRUDOLWLHV RI SURMHFW-environment organizing affords its 
members an increased level of control over not just endogenous project risks (as related to 
costs, time, scope etc.) but perhaps even exogenous risks that emerge within its surrounding 
organizational milieu. For example, research on such megaprojects might question to what 
extent, if at all, project members calculated, and sought to mitigate, the risk of changes in 
external ownership? The case of Greater Gabbard, where one on the original project sponsors 
left the project and then sued the project delivery firm, offers a salient reminder of the 
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importance of such questions in managing risk and knowledge within such projects.  This line 
of thinking is not without precedent; indeed to some extent it dovetails with Lundin and 
6RGHUKROP¶Vnotably seldom discussed recommendation that all projects, as temporary 
organizations, should develop strategies of µSODQQHG LVRODWLRQ¶ to guard themselves from a 
shifting organizational context and enable project control. Or conversely, perhaps in such 
troublesome cases, other less temporal features of megaproject organizing, such as unique task 
orientation and complex multi-disciplinary actors (Sanderson, 2012) continued to imbue 
project uncertainty and risk, and undermined any potential to manage external risks. Such 
important avenues for empirical research disappear from view when, as is customary across 
project management scholarship and practice, the external environment is assumed to be the 
stable platform for managing project risk and knowledge. 
 
In a similar vein the shifting temporalities of Greater Gabbard, and similar long-term 
megaprojects, also throw into relief challenges and opportunities to the projects as temporary 
organizations literature related to knowledge. To recall the arguments set out earlier in this 
paper, there is a pervasive view within this literature that projects exhibit a µlearning paradox¶ 
(Bakker et al. 2011): while the time-limit temporary organizing of projects is an important 
conduit for knowledge generation it can substantially impede knowledge sharing. A defining 
feature of recent research on this topic is the central importance given towards a µpermanent¶ 
RUJDQL]DWLRQDOPLOLHX LQRYHUFRPLQJ WKHµOHDUQLQJSDUDGR[¶RISURMHFWV LVVLPLODUO\JLYHQ LQ
other research (e.g. Brady and Davies, 2004; Grabher, 2004; Maaninen-Olsson and Müllern, 
2009). As Scarborough et al (2004) explain, µwhile projects are potentially important sites for 
the generation of learning, the nature, scope and applicability of such learning is ultimately 
shaped to a large H[WHQWE\WKHRQJRLQJOHDUQLQJDFWLYLWLHVRIWKHZLGHURUJDQL]DWLRQ¶S 
The case of Greater Gabbard introduces a productive problematization of the root assumption 
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at work here. That is, there exists, an ever-increasing number of megaprojects (Brookes and 
Sainati, 2015), that, while time bound projects, might endure, and be perceived to endure, far 
beyond their time-indefinite organizational milieu. This introduces important questions around 
how knowledge is generated and then shared in such long-term temporary organizations. 
Might, for example, a long-term infrastructural megaproject project with a termination point 
several decades away become a focus for knowledge sharing across a more dynamic 
organizational milieu? Or instead, does such a project remain a focus for knowledge 
exploration not exploitation (Davies and Brady, 2004)? And indeed, what role do the relative 
temporalities, and perceptions of the relative temporalities, between the lifespans of, for 
example ± project infrastructure (in our case turbine blades, generators, foundations) ± SPVs 
(GGOWL) ± sponsoring organizations (SSE, Fluor) ± sub-contractors and organizational 
members careers ± play in the extent to which a megaproject enables knowledge generation or 
sharing? Such questions remainhidden from view by an assumed dichotomy, including that 
JLYHQ LQ WKH QRWLRQ RI WKH µOHDUQLQJ SDUDGR[¶ LWVHOI ZKHUH NQRZOHGJH JHQHUDWLRQ RFFXUV LQ
temporary organizations and knowledge sharing in wider, permanent, organizational context 
(Brady and Davies, 2004; Burke and Morley, 2016; Grabher, 2004; Hobday, 2000; 
Scarborough et al. 2004; Sydow et al. 2004). While seemingly intuitive, such dichotomous 
thinking seems to simply stem from the discursive connotation that permanence is defined as 
relatively long-term organizing (instead of time-indefinite ± Bakker et al. 2016; Jacobbson et 
al. 2015). By considering megaprojects that outlive their organizational milieu we can start to 
challenge such assumptions, and by extension pursue a fuller consideration of the implications 
of what it means to consider projects as temporary organizations because they are time-bound 
not relatively short-term (Bakker et al. 2016). 
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In developing new theoretical understanding of the multiple, relative, temporalities of long-
term infrastructural megaprojects, and perhaps other long-term projects, we find the notion of 
µSHUPDQHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQV¶DJDLQVWZKLFKµWHPSRUDU\RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶DUHRIWHQMX[WDSRVHGLQWKH
existing literature, to be inherently problematic. As the example of knowledge and risk above 
indicates, far too frequently the notion of µSHUPDQHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶, remains, despite caveats 
to the contrary (Bakker et al. 2016), associated with notions of relative longevity rather than 
time-boundedness. As we have been at pains to argue here, these discursively constructed 
temporal connotations continue to have a lasting and troubling legacy in veiling from view 
important avenues for contributions that temporary organizing researchers might make towards 
understandings of the temporalities of megaprojects. Our view is that any understanding of 
permanence is itself, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, temporary as (like any temporality) it 
is contingent: enacted in particular places and times. We contend that it is thus necessary to 
problematize and unpack the notion of permanence to avoid simplistic temporal dichotomies 
and to better theorise and understand temporal phenomena across different, interacting, 
WLPHVFDOHVµ3HUPDQHQFH¶, the perception of a time-indefinite, consistent, organizational form, 
might be thus considered as a distinct temporality that is itself performed, whether in scholarly 
work or in practice, through an opposition with a time-limited organization. But, empirically, 
this time-limit does not necessarily imply a relatively shorter perceived duration. Indeed while 
an organizational form might be perceived as time indefinite, it is still perceived against a life 
expectancy range within which its termination is likely (De Geus, 2002). The knowledge that 
the foundations at Greater Gabbard will have to be decommissioned at a fixed point in several 
decades does not negate the plausibility WKDWµSDUHQW¶RUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHOLNHO\WRKDYHE\WKHQ
been merged or dissolved, careers completed and lives lived. When viewed against such 
temporal complexities the most crucial point to conjoin our argument to the projects as 
temporary organization research, and indeed the wider temporary organization literature, is a 
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renewed need for greater consideration of the relative, multiple temporalities of organizing. It 
is the ecology of relative temporalities between organizational forms and actors (human and 
potentially nonhuman), which defines the troublesome case of megaprojects. And, indeed, 
relative to other temporary organization research it is this contribution that appears most fruitful 
in the development of further theories of temporary organizing (Bakker et al. 2016). 
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